<?xml version="1.0" encoding="iso-8859-1"?>
<rss version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Eurosurveillance latest updates</title>
    <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/</link>
    <description>Eurosurveillance: peer-reviewed european information on communicable disease surveillance and control</description>
    <langage>eng</langage>
    <copyright>Copyright: http://www.eurosurveillance.org</copyright>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss/</docs>
    <generator>Eurosurveillance news RSS generator</generator>
    <managineditor>visit: http://www.eurosurveillance.org</managineditor>
    <webmaster>visit: http://www.eurosurveillance.org</webmaster>
    
    <ttl>1</ttl>
    <item>
      <title>Estimating the impact of the 2009 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic on mortality in the elderly in Navarre, Spain</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19481</link>
      <description>We analysed mortality among people aged 65 years or older in Navarre, Spain in 2009 and compared it with the mean for the same period of time in the previous three years. In the pandemic weeks 24 to 52 2009 we observed 4.9% more deaths than expected (p=0.0268). Excess mortality occurred during the circulation of seasonal influenza (8.0%, p=0.0367) and the first wave of pandemic influenza (9.9%, p=0.0079). In the second wave of pandemic influenza there was a non-significant excess of deaths (5.2%, p=0.1166). Surveillance of laboratory-confirmed severe influenza cases detected only one death in this age group. </description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 04 Feb 2010 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19481</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>High frequency of cross-reacting antibodies against 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) virus among the elderly in Finland</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19478</link>
      <description>Since May 2009, the pandemic influenza A(H1N1) virus has been spreading throughout the world. Epidemiological data indicate that the elderly are underrepresented among the ill individuals. Approximately 1,000 serum specimens collected in Finland in 2004 and 2005 from individuals born between 1909 and 2005, were analysed by haemagglutination-inhibition test for the presence of antibodies against the 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) and recently circulating seasonal influenza A viruses. Ninety-six per cent of individuals born between 1909 and 1919 had antibodies against the 2009 pandemic influenza virus, while in age groups born between 1920 and 1944, the prevalence varied from 77% to 14%. Most individuals born after 1944 lacked antibodies to the pandemic virus. In sequence comparisons the haemagglutinin (HA) gene of the 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) virus was closely related to that of the Spanish influenza and 1976 swine influenza viruses. Based on the three-dimensional structure of the HA molecule, the antigenic epitopes of the pandemic virus HA are more closely related to those of the Spanish influenza HA than to those of recent seasonal influenza A(H1N1) viruses. Among the elderly, cross-reactive antibodies against the 2009 pandemic influenza virus, which likely originate from infections caused by the Spanish influenza virus and its immediate descendants, may provide protective immunity against the present pandemic virus.
</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 04 Feb 2010 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19478</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>School absence data for influenza surveillance: a pilot study in the United Kingdom</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19467</link>
      <description>School-age children are at a high risk of acute respiratory virus infections including the 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1). School absence records have been suggested as a tool for influenza surveillance. We analysed absence records from six primary schools (children aged from around five to 11 years) in London during the years 2005 to 2007 in order to provide baseline epidemiological characteristics of illness-related school absence, and to correlate school absence with seasonal influenza. The daily average prevalence of absence due to illness was 2.9%. The incidence was 1.3% per person-day. The mean duration of absence was 1.8 days (SD 1.8). Over 60% of absence episodes lasted for one day. Absence prevalence did not differ by sex. Prevalence was highest in the youngest children and then declined slightly, but was again high again in the oldest. Absence was slightly higher on Mondays and Fridays. In general, peaks of absenteeism coincided with peaks of influenza A and B (laboratory reports) but several high peaks were not associated with influenza. There was a better correlation between absence and laboratory reports and prevalence compared to incidence. School absence data may be useful for the detection of localised school outbreaks and as an additional surveillance tool but are limited by lack of data on weekends and during holidays.  
</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 21 Jan 2010 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19467</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The vaccination campaign against 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) and its continued importance in view of the uncertainty surrounding the risk associated with the pandemic</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19468</link>
      <description>
      </description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 21 Jan 2010 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19468</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Surveillance of Hospitalisations for 2009 Pandemic Influenza A(H1N1) in the Netherlands, 5 June - 31 December 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19461</link>
      <description>We analysed and reported on a weekly basis clinical and epidemiological characteristics of patients hospitalised in the Netherlands for the 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) using information from the national mandatory notification system. The notification criteria changed on 15 August 2009 from all possible, probable and confirmed cases to only laboratory-confirmed pandemic influenza hospitalisations and deaths. In the period of comprehensive case-based surveillance (until 15 August), 2% (35/1,622) of the patients with pandemic influenza were hospitalised. From 5 June to 31 December 2009, a total of 2,181 patients were hospitalised. Of these, 10% (219/2,181) were admitted to an intensive care unit (ICU) and 53 died. Among non-ICU hospitalised patients, 56% (961/1,722) had an underlying medical condition compared with 70% (147/211) of the patients in ICU and 46 of the 51 fatal cases for whom this information was reported. Most common complications were dehydration among non-ICU hospitalised patients and acute respiratory distress syndrome among patients in ICU and patients who died. Children under the age of five years had the highest age-specific hospitalisation rate (62.7/100,000), but relatively few were admitted to an ICU (1.7/100,000). Characteristics and admission rates of hospitalised patients were comparable with reports from other countries and previous influenza seasons. The national notification system was well suited to provide weekly updates of relevant monitoring information on the severity of the pandemic for professionals, decision makers, the media and the public, and could be rapidly adapted to changing information requirements. 
</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 Jan 2010 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19461</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Severe hospitalised 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) cases in France, 1 July-15 November 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19463</link>
      <description>From 1 July 2009 to 15 November 2009, 244 patients with 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) were admitted to intensive care unit (ICU) and were compared with 514 cases hospitalised in medical wards in France until 2 November 2009. Detailed case-based epidemiological information and outcomes were gathered for all hospitalised cases. Infants and pregnant women are overrepresented among cases admitted to ICU with seven per cent for both groups respectively, and twenty per cent of ICU cases did not belong to a risk group. Chronic respiratory disease was the most common risk factor among cases but obesity (body mass index ? 30 Kg/m2), chronic cardiac disease and immunosuppression were risk factors associated with severe illness after adjustment for age and for other co-morbidities. </description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 Jan 2010 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19463</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A nosocomial outbreak of 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) in a paediatric oncology ward in Italy, October - November 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19454</link>
      <description>A nosocomial outbreak of 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1), with eight confirmed cases, occurred in a paediatric oncology ward in Italy, in October/November 2009. The fact that one case was infected despite being isolated and without contact to a symptomatic patient, hints towards potential transmission through a health care worker (HCW) and underlines the importance of vaccination of HCW who are involved in the care of critically ill patients.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 07 Jan 2010 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19454</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>When should we intervene to control the 2009 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic?</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19455</link>
      <description>We simulated the early phase of the 2009 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic and assessed the effectiveness of public health interventions in Japan.  We show that the detection rate of border quarantine was low and the timing of the intervention was the most important factor involved in the control of the pandemic, with the maximum reduction in daily cases obtained after interventions started on day 6 or 11. Early interventions were not always effective. </description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 07 Jan 2010 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19455</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Outbreak of 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1), Los Lagos, Chile, April-June 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19456</link>
      <description>By 27 June, a total of 14.559 clinical cases were identified in Los Lagos, affecting mostly 5-19 year-olds. The effective reproduction number during the initial phase (20 days) was 1.8 (1.6-2.0). Of the 190 confirmed cases with severe acute respiratory infection, 71 (37,4%) presented a risk condition or underlying illness. </description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 07 Jan 2010 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19456</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Quantifying the risk of pandemic influenza in pregnancy and Indigenous people in Australia in 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19441</link>
      <description>An increased relative risk of infection with the 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza virus associated with pregnancy and Indigenous status has been a common finding in many countries. Using publicly available data from May to October 2009 in Australia, we estimated the relative risk of hospitalisation, admission to intensive care unit and death as 5.2, 6.5 and 1.4 respectively for pregnant women, and as 6.6, 6.2 and 5.2, respectively for Indigenous Australians. Pregnancy and Indigenous status were associated with severe influenza. More complete analyses of risks in these groups are required to understand and prevent influenza morbidity and mortality.
</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Dec 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19441</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Public perceptions in relation to intention to receive pandemic influenza vaccination in a random population sample: evidence from a cross-sectional telephone survey
</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19437</link>
      <description>A cross-sectional telephone survey on a nationally representative sample of 1,000 Greek households was performed to assess the acceptability of the pandemic influenza A(H1N1)v vaccine, factors associated with intention to decline and stated reasons for declining vaccination. The survey was initiated the last week of August 2009 (week 35) and is still ongoing (analysis up to week 44). The percentage of participants answering they would "probably not/definitely not" accept the vaccine increased from 47.1% in week 35 to 63.1% in week 44 (test for trend: p&lt;0.001). More than half of the people which chronic illnesses (53.3%) indicated "probably not/definitely not". Factors associated with intention to decline vaccination were female sex, age between 30-64 years, perception of low likelihood of getting infected or of low risk associated with influenza, and absence of household members suffering from chronic illnesses. For the majority of the respondents (59.8%), the main reason for intending to decline vaccination was the belief that the vaccine might not be safe. Promotion of vaccination programmes should be designed taking into account the attitudinal barriers to the pandemic vaccine.
</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Dec 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19437</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Behaviours regarding preventive measures against pandemic H1N1 influenza among Italian healthcare workers, October 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19432</link>
      <description>A survey on attitudes and behaviours towards preventive measures against pandemic H1N1 influenza 2009 was carried out during the month of October 2009 in Italy through an online questionnaire adapted to the Italian situation from a similar survey of the Harvard School of Public Health in the United States (US). Results show that the intention to get vaccinated against pandemic H1N1 influenza 2009 is generally low and that there are differences in attitudes and behaviours towards preventive measures against pandemic H1N1 influenza 2009 between physicians and nurses, especially concerning vaccination. Differences relate also to sex, region of residence and marital status. 
 </description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Dec 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19432</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Behaviour of the pandemic H1N1 influenza virus in Andalusia, Spain, at the onset of the 2009-10 season</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19433</link>
      <description>In Andalusia, Spain, the pandemic influenza A(H1N1)v virus has spread throughout the community, being the dominant influenza strain in the season so far. The current objective of the Andalusia Health Service is focussed on the mitigation of the health and social impact by appropriate care of the patients at home or in health centres. The 2009-10 seasonal influenza epidemic started early compared with to previous seasons. This article analyses the influenza A(H1N1)v situation in Andalusia until the week 39/2009.
</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Dec 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19433</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Prolonged shedding of influenza A(H1N1)v virus: two case reports from France 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19434</link>
      <description>We observed a prolonged shedding of virus 14 and 28 days after symptom onset in two patients with pandemic H1N1 influenza, who did not have immunodepression and were treated with neuraminidase inhibitor. This prolonged shedding was not associated with the emergence of resistance mutation H275Y in the viral neuraminidase gene.
</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Dec 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19434</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Differentiation of two distinct clusters among currently circulating influenza A(H1N1)v viruses, March-September 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19409</link>
      <description>Analysis of all complete genome sequences of the pandemic influenza A(H1N1)v virus available as of 10 September 2009 revealed that two closely related but distinct clusters were circulating in most of the affected countries at the same time. The characteristic differences are located in genes encoding the two surface proteins - haemagglutinin and neuraminidase - and four internal proteins - the polymerase PB2 subunit, nucleoprotein, matrix protein M1 and the non-structural protein NS1. Phylogenetic inference was demonstrated by neighbour joining, maximum likelihood and Bayesian trees analyses of the involved genes and by tree construction of concatenated sequences.
</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19409</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1) viruses detected in Europe during season 2007-8 had epidemiologic and clinical characteristics similar to co-circulating susceptible A(H1N1) viruses
</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19412</link>
      <description>
      </description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19412</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A simple mathematical approach to deciding the dosage of vaccine against pandemic H1N1 influenza</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19396</link>
      <description>Results from early clinical trials have shown that a single dose of pandemic H1N1 influenza vaccine may generate sufficient antibody response, but the relevance of this fact to public health decision making has yet to be clarified. The present study compares the risk of clinical attack (i.e. clinical attack rate) between one- and two-dose vaccination schemes. If the efficacies do not greatly vary between one- and two -dose schemes, one-dose vaccination may well be supported. Nevertheless, two-dose vaccination is shown to result in less morbidity if the vaccine efficacies are greatly diminished by reducing the dose. As long as the detailed efficacy estimates rest on theoretical assumptions, single-dose vaccination may only be sufficiently justified in a specific setting where the number of vaccines is extremely limited.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19396</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Assessing the impact of the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic on reporting of other threats through the Early Warning and Response System</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19397</link>
      <description>Since the start of 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, a notable surge in messages communicated through the Early Warning and Response System (EWRS) for the prevention and control of communicable diseases in the European Union has been recorded. In order to measure the impact of this increase on the reporting of other events, we compared the messages posted in the EWRS since April 2009 with those posted in the previous years (2004-2008). The analysis revealed that a ten-fold increase in messages was recorded during the pandemic period, from April to September 2009, and that the reporting of other threats dropped to a significantly low rate. These results suggest an important impact on the notification process of events in case of a situation requiring extensive mobilisation of public health resources. It emphasises the importance keeping an appropriate balancing of resources during sustained emergencies, in particular in view of a possible second wave of pandemic influenza cases, to ensure prompt detection and reporting of potential concomitant emerging threats. </description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19397</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Syndromic surveillance: the next phase of public health monitoring during the H1N1 influenza pandemic?</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19391</link>
      <description>
      </description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19391</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Surveillance of the first 205 confirmed hospitalised cases of pandemic H1N1 influenza in Ireland, 28 April - 3 October 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19389</link>
      <description>From 28 April 2009 to 3 October 2009, 205 cases of confirmed pandemic H1N1 influenza were hospitalised in Ireland. Detailed case-based epidemiological information was gathered on all hospitalised cases. Age-specific hospitalisation rates were highest in the age group of 15 to 19 year-olds and lowest in those aged 65 years and over. Nineteen hospitalised cases (9%) were admitted to intensive care units (ICU) where the median length of stay was 24 days. Four hospitalised cases (2%) died. Fifty-one percent of hospitalised cases and 42% of ICU cases were not in a recognised risk group. Asthma was the most common risk factor among cases; however, people with haemoglobinopathies and immunosuppression were the most over-represented groups. 
</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19389</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Measures against transmission of pandemic H1N1 influenza in Japan in 2009: simulation model</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19385</link>
      <description>The first outbreak of pandemic H1N1 influenza in Japan was contained in the Kansai region in May 2009 by social distancing measures. Modelling methods are needed to estimate the validity of these measures before their implementation on a large scale. We estimated the transmission coefficient from outbreaks of pandemic H1N1 influenza among school children in Japan in summer 2009; using this transmission coefficient, we simulated the spread of pandemic H1N1 influenza in a virtual community called the virtual Chuo Line which models an area to the west of metropolitan Tokyo. Measures evaluated in our simulation included: isolation at home, school closure, post-exposure prophylaxis and mass vaccinations of school children. We showed that post-exposure prophylaxis combined with isolation at home and school closure significantly decreases the total number of cases in the community and can mitigate the spread of pandemic H1N1 influenza, even when there is a delay in the availability of vaccine.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19385</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Interpreting "Google Flu Trends" data for pandemic H1N1 influenza: The New Zealand experience</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19386</link>
      <description>For the period of the spread of pandemic H1N1 influenza in New Zealand during 2009, we compared results from Google Flu Trends with data from existing surveillance systems. The patterns from Google Flu Trends were closely aligned with (peaking a week before and a week after) two independent national surveillance systems for influenza-like illness (ILI) cases. It was much less congruent with (delayed by three weeks) data from ILI-related calls to a national free-phone Healthline and with media coverage of pandemic influenza. Some patterns were unique to Google Flu Trends and may not have reflected the actual ILI burden in the community. Overall, Google Flu Trends appears to provide a useful free surveillance system but it should probably be seen as supplementary rather than as an alternative.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19386</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Pandemic H1N1 influenza lessons from the southern hemisphere</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19370</link>
      <description>
      </description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19370</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Preliminary analysis of the pandemic H1N1 influenza on Réunion Island (Indian Ocean): surveillance trends (July to mid-September 2009)</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19364</link>
      <description>First infections with the 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza virus were identified on Réunion Island in July 2009. By the end of July, sustained community transmission of the virus was established. Pandemic H1N1 influenza activity peaked during week 35 (24 to 30 August), five weeks after the beginning of the epidemic and has been declining since week 36. We report preliminary epidemiological characteristics of the pandemic on Réunion Island in 2009 until week 37 ending September 13.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19364</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Interim report on pandemic H1N1 influenza virus infections in South Africa, April to October 2009: Epidemiology and factors associated with fatal cases</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19369</link>
      <description>We provide an interim report on pandemic H1N1 influenza activity in South Africa, with a focus on the epidemiology and factors associated with deaths. Following the importation of the virus on 14 July 2009, and the epidemic peak during the week starting 3 August, the incidence in South Africa has declined. A total of 12,331 cases and 91 deaths have been laboratory-confirmed as of 12 October 2009. Age distribution and risk groups were similar to those observed elsewhere. The median age of patients who died (33.5 years) was significantly higher than that of the non-fatal cases (15.0 years, p&lt;0.01). The most common underlying conditions among fatal cases were infection with human immunodeficiency virus (17/32 tested) and pregnancy (25/45 women of reproductive age). Active tuberculosis coinfection was present in seven of 72 fatal cases. These findings should be taken into consideration when planning vaccination strategies for 2010.
</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19369</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Pandemic H1N1 influenza in Brazil: Analysis of the first 34,506 notified cases of influenza-like illness with severe acute respiratory infection (SARI)</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19362</link>
      <description>Recently, the brunt of the current influenza pandemic has been felt in the southern hemisphere. We report an analysis of the first 34,506 cases of influenza-like illness with severe acute respiratory infection (SARI) notified in Brazil during the epidemiological weeks 16 to 33. The 5,747 confirmed cases of pandemic H1N1 influenza showed two incidence peaks across the age span: one in children up to the age of five years (3.8/100,000) and one in individuals aged 20 to 29 years (4.6/100,000). People over the age of 60 had the lowest incidence (1.1/100,000 inhabitants). The epidemic peaked rapidly. Ninety-four percent of cases were concentrated in two of Brazil's five geographic regions - the south and southeast, regions that have a more temperate climate and thus colder winters. Case-fatality of pandemic influenza presenting with SARI was 11.2% (95% confidence interval (CI): 10.4%-12.1%). People with a reported comorbidity had approximately twice the risk of those without (relative risk=1.89; 95%CI: 1.64-2.18).</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19362</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Pandemic influenza in a southern hemisphere setting: the experience in Peru from May to September, 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19371</link>
      <description>This paper presents a description of Peru's experience with pandemic H1N1 influenza 2009. It is based on data from four main surveillance systems: a) ongoing sentinel surveillance of influenza-like illness cases with virological surveillance of influenza and other respiratory viruses; b) sentinel surveillance of severe acute respiratory infections and associated deaths; c) surveillance of acute respiratory infections in children under the age of five years and pneumonia in all age groups; and d) case and cluster surveillance. On 9 May 2009, the first confirmed case of pandemic H1N1 influenza in Peru was diagnosed in a Peruvian citizen returning from New York with a respiratory illness. By July, community transmission of influenza had been identified and until 27 September 2009, a total of 8,381 cases were confirmed. The incidence rate per 10,000 persons was 4.4 (in the 0-9 year-olds) and 4.1 (in the 10-19 year-olds). During epidemiological weeks (EW) 26 to 37, a total of 143 fatal cases were notified (a case fatality of 1.71%, based on confirmed cases). The maximum peak in the number of cases was reached in EW 30 with 37 deaths. Currently, the impact of the pandemic in the Peruvian population has not been too severe, and fortunately, healthcare centres have not been overwhelmed. However, the future of this pandemic is uncertain and despite the fact that our country has not been seriously affected, we should be prepared for upcoming pandemic waves.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19371</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Progression and impact of the first winter wave of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza in New South Wales, Australia</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19365</link>
      <description>A range of surveillance systems were used to assess the progression and impact of the first wave of pandemic H1N1 influenza in New South Wales, Australia during the southern hemisphere winter. Surveillance methods included laboratory notifications, near real-time emergency department syndromic surveillance, ambulance despatch surveillance, death certificate surveillance and purpose-built web-based data systems to capture influenza clinic and intensive care unit activity. The epidemic lasted 10 weeks. By 31 August 2009, 1,214 people with pandemic H1N1 influenza infection were hospitalised (17.2 per 100,000 population), 225 were admitted to intensive care (3.2 per 100,000), and 48 died (0.7 per 100,000). Children aged 0-4 years had the highest hospitalisation rates, while adults aged 50-54 had the highest rates of intensive care admission. During the epidemic period, overall presentations to emergency departments were 6% higher than in 2008, while presentations for influenza-like illness were 736% higher. At the peak, confirmed cases of pandemic H1N1 influenza consumed 15% of intensive care capacity. Excess mortality from influenza and pneumonia was lower than in recent influenza seasons. Health services, particularly emergency departments and intensive care units, were substantially affected by the epidemic. Mortality from influenza was comparable with previous seasons.
</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19365</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Pandemic H1N1 influenza surveillance in Victoria, Australia, April - September, 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19368</link>
      <description>Victoria was the first Australian state to report widespread transmission of pandemic H1N1 2009 influenza. Notifiable laboratory-confirmed influenza and a general practitioner sentinel surveillance system measuring influenza-like illness (ILI), including laboratory confirmation of influenza as the cause of ILI, were used to assess the pandemic. The pandemic influenza A(H1N1)v virus quickly became the dominant circulating strain and notification rates were highest in children and young adults. Despite a high number of notified cases, comparison of ILI rates suggested the season peaked in late June, was similar in magnitude to 2003 and 2007 and less severe than 1997. The majority of clinical presentations were mild, but one quarter of hospitalised cases required admission to intensive care. Given the low proportion of imported cases in the Victorian pandemic, the rapid increase in cases with no travel history and the low median age of cases notified during the phases of intense surveillance, we suggest there may have been silent importations of pandemic virus into Victoria before the first case was recognised. The usefulness of a general practitioner sentinel surveillance system to provide a comparable assessment of influenza and ILI activity over time was clearly demonstrated, and the need for similar hospital and mortality surveillance systems for influenza in Victoria was highlighted.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19368</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Early transmission characteristics of influenza A(H1N1)v in Australia: Victorian state, 16 May - 3 June 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19363</link>
      <description>Australia was one of the first countries of the southern hemisphere to experience influenza A(H1N1)v with community transmission apparent in Victoria, Australia, by 22 May 2009. With few identified imported cases, the epidemic spread through schools and communities leading to 897 confirmed cases by 3 June 2009. The estimated reproduction ratio up to 31 May 2009 was 2.4 (95% credible interval (CI): 2.1-2.6). Methods designed to account for undetected transmission reduce this estimate to 1.6 (95% CI: 1.5-1.8). Time varying reproduction ratio estimates show a steady decline in observed transmission over the first 14 days of the epidemic. This could be accounted for by ascertainment bias or a true impact of interventions including antiviral prophylaxis, treatment and school closure. Most cases (78%) in the first 19 days in Victoria were under the age of 20 years-old. Estimates suggest that the average youth primary case infected at least two other youths in the early growth phase, which was sufficient to drive the epidemic.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19363</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza and indigenous populations of the Americas and the Pacific</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19366</link>
      <description>There are few structured data available to assess the risks associated with pandemic influenza A(H1N1)v infection according to ethnic groups. In countries of the Americas and the Pacific where these data are available, the attack rates are higher in indigenous populations, who also appear to be at approximately three to six-fold higher risk of developing severe disease and of dying. These observations may be associated with documented risk factors for severe disease and death associated with pandemic H1N1 influenza infection (especially the generally higher prevalence of diabetes, obesity, asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and pregnancy in indigenous populations). More speculative factors include those associated with the risk of infection (e.g. family size, crowding and poverty), differences in access to health services and, perhaps, genetic factors. Whatever the causes, this increased vulnerability of indigenous populations justify specific immediate actions in the control of the current pandemic including primary prevention (intensified hygiene promotion, chemoprophylaxis and vaccination) and secondary prevention (improved access to services and early treatment following symptoms onset) of severe pandemic H1N1 influenza infection.
</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19366</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Use of an inactivated vaccine in mitigating pandemic influenza A(H1N1) spread: a modelling study to assess the impact of vaccination timing and prioritisation strategies</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19356</link>
      <description>The impact of prioritisation and of timing of vaccination strategies on reducing transmission of pandemic influenza A(H1N1) was evaluated in a community with the structure of the Greek population using a stochastic simulation model.  Prioritisation scenarios were based on the recommendations of the United States Centers' for Disease Control and Prevention Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices and vaccination was assumed to initiate either before or during the ongoing epidemic. In the absence of intervention, an illness attack rate (AR) of 34.5% is anticipated. Vaccinating the priority groups before the epidemic (pregnant women, people who live with or care for children &lt;6 months of age, healthcare/emergency services personnel, children 6 months-4 years old and high-risk children 5-18 years old) will have a negligible impact on the overall AR. Vaccinating the recommended groups before the epidemic (priority groups as well as all persons 6 months-24  years old and high-risk individuals 25-64 years old) is anticipated to result in overall and age-specific ARs within the range of seasonal influenza (5%-15%). Initiating vaccination early during the epidemic (AR?1% of the population) is predicted to result in overall ARs up to 15.2%-19.9% depending on daily vaccination coverage rates. When vaccination is initiated at a later stage (AR: 5%), only coverage of 80% of the whole population at intensive daily vaccination rates would be able to reduce ARs to approximately 15%.  </description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19356</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Pandemic H1N1 influenza: predicting the course of a pandemic and assessing the efficacy of the planned vaccination programme in the United States</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19358</link>
      <description>We use data on confirmed cases of pandemic influenza A(H1N1), disseminated by the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention(US CDC), to fit the parameters of a seasonally forced Susceptible, Infective, Recovered (SIR) model. We use the resulting model to predict the course of the H1N1 influenza pandemic in autumn 2009, and we assess the efficacy of the planned CDC H1N1 vaccination campaign. The model predicts that there will be a significant wave in autumn, with 63% of the population being infected, and that this wave will peak so early that the planned CDC vaccination campaign will likely not have a large effect on the total number of people ultimately infected by the pandemic H1N1 influenza virus.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19358</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Resistance of turkeys to experimental infection with an early 2009 Italian human influenza A(H1N1)v virus isolate</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19360</link>
      <description>We performed an experimental infection of 21- and 70-day-old meat turkeys with an early human isolate of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza virus exhibiting an ?-2,3 receptor binding profile. Virus was not recovered by molecular or conventional methods from blood, tracheal and cloacal swabs, lungs, intestine or muscle tissue. Seroconversion was detected in a limited number of birds with the homologous antigen only. Our findings suggest that in its present form, the pandemic H1N1 influenza virus is not likely to be transmitted to meat turkeys and does therefore not represent an animal health or food safety issue for this species.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19360</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Residual immunity in older people against the influenza A(H1N1) - recent experience in northern Spain</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19344</link>
      <description>The 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) virus has a higher incidence in children and young adults, a pattern that has also been reported in seasonal influenza caused by the influenza A(H1N1) virus. We analysed age at infection in symptomatic patients with influenza in the Basque Country (northern Spain), reported through the sentinel influenza surveillance system which monitors 2.2-2.5% of the population. Between September 1999 and August 2009, influenza A(H3N2) or seasonal influenza A(H1N1) was detected in 941 patients, and from April to August 2009, pandemic influenza A(H1N1) was detected in 112 patients. The H3/H1 seasonal influenza ratio was between 3.3 and 3.4 in the under 60 year-olds, but 9.8 in older individuals, suggesting that people born before 1950 have residual immunity against the influenza A H1N1 subtype (both seasonal and pandemic).  

Introduction

In 1957, the Asian influenza pandemic was caused by influenza A(H2N2) virus, which circulated until 1968 when it was displaced by the influenza A(H3N2) virus which was responsible for the Hong Kong pandemic. Before 1957, direct descendants of the influenza A(H1N1) virus that had caused the 1918 pandemic (Spanish flu) had circulated. In 1977, an influenza A(H1N1) strain re-emerged, which, together with the dominant influenza A(H3N2) strain, has been the cause of seasonal human influenza for more than three decades [1]. Despite the prolonged co-circulation of both subtypes, few studies have analysed their ability to affect distinct age groups. 

The current pandemic influenza A(H1N1) virus, influenza A(H1N1)v, which emerged in the spring of 2009, has spread throughout the world. The aim of this study was to compare the distribution in distinct age groups of infections caused by the two subtypes of seasonal influenza in the past 10 seasons and refer therelate this to  recent infections due to influenza A(H1N1)v. 

</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19344</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Early estimates of 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) virus activity in general practice in France: incidence of influenza-like illness and age distribution of reported cases</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19341</link>
      <description>In the end of August 2009, an unusually elevated level of influenza-like illness (ILI) activity was reported to the French Sentinel Network. We quantified the observed excess in ILI cases in France during summer 2009 and characterised age patterns in reported cases. An excess of cases has been observed since 5 July, with a time increasing trend. The cumulated estimated excess number of ILI cases was 269,935 [179,585; 316,512], corresponding to 0.5% French population over the period. Compared to the same period in the past years, relative cumulated incidence was greater among young subjects and lower among subjects over 65 years old. Compared to past epidemics, the relative cumulated incidence was greater in children less than 5 years old. This excess of cases may reflect the current spread of the A(H1N1) virus in France, subject to the following limitations: estimates were based on clinical cases consulting a GP; large media coverage may have led to a non specific increase in consultation rates.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19341</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Enhanced surveillance of initial cases of pandemic H1N1 2009 influenza in Ireland, April - July 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19337</link>
      <description>From 28 April to 18 July 2009 there were 156 cases of pandemic H1N1 2009 influenza confirmed in Ireland.  During this time, Ireland was in containment phase, and detailed case-based epidemiological information was gathered on all cases presenting in the community and acute health care setting.  Active case finding was performed among contacts of cases.  Eighty percent of cases were in people less than 35 years of age and 86% were imported.  The most frequent symptoms were fever, sore throat, myalgia and dry cough.  Nine people were hospitalized, no fatalities occurred.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19337</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Oseltamivir susceptibility in south-western France during the 2007-8 and 2008-9 influenza epidemics and the ongoing influenza pandemic 2009
</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19334</link>
      <description>The recent emergence of seasonal influenza A(H1N1) strains resistant to oseltamivir makes it necessary to monitoring carefully the susceptibility of human influenza viruses to neuraminidase inhibitors. We report the prevalence of the oseltamivir resistance among influenza A viruses circulating in south-western France over the past three years: seasonal influenza A(H1N1), seasonal influenza A(H3N2), and the influenza A(H1N1)v viruses associated with the ongoing 2009 pandemic. The main result of the study is the absence of oseltamivir resistance in the pandemic H1N1 strains studied so far (n=129).</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19334</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Sub-optimal hand sanitiser usage in a hospital entrance during an influenza pandemic, New Zealand, August 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19331</link>
      <description>The hand hygiene behaviours of the public in response to the current H1N1 influenza pandemic 2009 (or other pandemics) have not previously been described. An observational study was undertaken to examine hand hygiene behaviours by people passing a hand sanitiser station in the foyer of a public hospital in New Zealand in August 2009. Of the 2,941 subjects observed, 449 (18.0%, 95% confidence interval: 16.6, 19.6) used the hand sanitiser. This is a far from optimal result in response to the health promotion initiatives in the setting of a pandemic. These findings suggest the need for more effective health promotion of hand hygiene and also provide baseline measurements for future evaluation of hygiene practices.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Sep 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19331</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Economic consequences to society of pandemic H1N1 influenza 2009 - 
preliminary results for Sweden</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19333</link>
      <description>Experiments using a microsimulation platform show that vaccination against pandemic H1N1 influenza is highly cost-effective. Swedish society may reduce the costs of pandemic by about SEK 2.5 billion (approximately EUR 250 million) if at least 60 per cent of the population is vaccinated, even if costs related to death cases are excluded. The cost reduction primarily results from reduced absenteeism. These results are preliminary and based on comprehensive assumptions about the infectiousness and morbidity of the pandemic, which are uncertain in the current situation.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Sep 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19333</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Detection of influenza A(H1N1)v virus by real-time RT-PCR</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19329</link>
      <description>Influenza A(H1N1)v virus was first identified in April 2009. A novel real-time RT-PCR for influenza A(H1N1)v virus was set up ad hoc and validated following industry-standard criteria. The lower limit of detection of the assay was 384 copies of viral RNA per ml of viral transport medium (95% confidence interval: 273-876 RNA copies/ml). Specificity was 100% as assessed on a panel of reference samples including seasonal human influenza A virus H1N1 and H3N2, highly pathogenic avian influenza A virus H5N1 and porcine influenza A virus H1N1, H1N2 and H3N2 samples. The real-time RT-PCR assay for the influenza A matrix gene recommended in 2007 by the World Health Organization was modified to work under the same reaction conditions as the influenza A(H1N1)v virus-specific test. Both assays were equally sensitive. Clinical applicability of both assays was demonstrated by screening of almost 2,000 suspected influenza (H1N1)v specimens, which included samples from the first cases of pandemic H1N1 influenza imported to Germany. Measuring influenza A(H1N1)v virus concentrations in 144 laboratory-confirmed samples yielded a median of 4.6 log RNA copies/ml. The new methodology proved its principle and might assist public health laboratories in the upcoming influenza pandemic. 
</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19329</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Assessment of secondary attack rate and effectiveness of antiviral prophylaxis among household contacts in an influenza A(H1N1)v outbreak in Kobe, Japan, May-June 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19320</link>
      <description>This report describes the assessment of the secondary attack rate (SAR) and the effectiveness of post-exposure antiviral prophylaxis among household contacts in the first domestic outbreak of a novel influenza A(H1N1)v between mid-May and early June 2009 in Kobe city, Japan. Of the 293 subjects, 14 (4.8%) household contacts met the case definition and most secondary cases were probably infected around the time of symptom onset date of the respective index case. The SAR among household contacts who did not receive prophylaxis was 7.6%, similar to the rate of seasonal influenza, and the attack rate in siblings was significantly higher than that in parents. We conclude that it is important to establish routine infection control measures for households in order to prevent the spread of the virus among household contacts and, possibly, to the community. We could not conclude whether antiviral prophylaxis was effective or not. However, among close contacts with underlying disease who received prophylaxis, nobody developed a severe form of the disease.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 03 Sep 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19320</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Epidemiological analysis of the influenza A(H1N1)v outbreak in Bolivia, May-August 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19323</link>
      <description>The outbreak of pandemic influenza (H1N1) began in Bolivia on 25 May 2009. Between May and August, the National Center of Tropical Disease (CENETROP) analysed by RT-PCR 7,060 samples of which 12.7% were positive. A preliminary analysis of the 895 confirmed cases identified between May and August 2009 describes epidemiological and clinical characteristics. After the first imported cases from the United States and Peru, the locally acquired infections predominated (90%). The number of cases was highest in the age group of 10 to 29 year-olds, and 89.6% of cases were observed in people under the age of 40 years. Fever, cough, nasal discharge and headache remained the main symptoms.
</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 03 Sep 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19323</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Influenza A(H1N1)v in Germany: the first 10,000 cases</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19318</link>
      <description>The analysis of the first 10,000 cases of influenza A(H1N1)v in Germany confirms findings from other sources that the virus is currently mainly causing mild diseases, affecting mostly adolescents and young adults. Overall hospitalisation rate for influenza A(H1N1)v was low (7%). Only 3% of the cases had underlying conditions and pneumonia was rare (0.4%). Both reporting and testing requirements have been adapted recently, taking into consideration the additional information available on influenza A(H1N1)v infections.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 27 Aug 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19318</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Pandemic influenza A(H1N1)v in New Zealand: the experience from April to August 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19319</link>
      <description>The pandemic accelerated markedly in June, reaching a peak within four to six weeks, and has been declining since mid-July. Hospitalisations were markedly higher for Maori (age standardised relative risk (RR)=3.0, 95% CI: 2.9-3.2) and Pacific peoples (RR=6.7, 95% CI: 6.2-7.1) compared with Europeans and others.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 27 Aug 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19319</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Epidemiology of fatal cases associated with pandemic H1N1 influenza 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19309</link>
      <description>This article describes the characteristics of 574 deaths associated with pandemic H1N1 influenza up to 16 July 2009. Data (except from Canada and Australia) suggest that the elderly may to some extent be protected from infection. There was underlying disease in at least half of the fatal cases. Two risk factors seem of particular importance: pregnancy and metabolic condition (including obesity which has not been considered as risk factor in previous pandemics or seasonal influenza).</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19309</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The importance of school and social activities in the transmission of influenza A(H1N1)v: England, April - June 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19311</link>
      <description>During the containment phase in the United Kingdom (April to June 2009), a cluster of influenza A(H1N1)v cases was identified prompting further investigation and public health action by the Health Protection Agency. The first confirmed case, a pupil at a school in England, was imported. During the following two weeks, 16 further cases were confirmed with epidemiological links to the first imported case. In this cluster, we found that significant transmission occurred in two classes with attack rates of 17.4% and 7.4%. In each of the two classes a case had attended school whilst symptomatic. Other settings included a choir and a party. Minimum and maximum attack rates were 3.6% and 4.2% for the choir and 14.3% and 25% for the party. We did not find any evidence of transmission on two school bus trips despite exposure over 50 minutes to a symptomatic case and over two periods of 30 minutes to a case during the prodromal phase (i.e. within 12 hours of symptom onset). Nor was there onward transmission in another school despite exposure over several hours to two cases, both of whom attended school during the prodromal phase.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19311</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Epidemiological and clinical characteristics of influenza A(H1N1)v infection in children: The first 45 cases in Cyprus, June - August 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19312</link>
      <description>Following the first imported case in a tourist in Cyprus on 2 June 2009, the influenza A(H1N1)v virus has spread on the island affecting mainly young adults and children. We describe here the first 45 cases in children.  Fever, cough, rhinorrhoea and sore throat were the most common symptoms of infection. Half of the children had fever for one day or only for a few hours. Five children were hospitalised, and overall their symptoms were mild. Adherence to oseltamivir treatment was very high, with low frequency of gastrointestinal side effects such as nausea and vomiting. Camping places and summer schools played a significant role in spreading the infection among children of school age.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19312</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Cases of influenza A(H1N1)v reported in Turkey, May-July 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19304</link>
      <description>Following the declaration by the World Health Organization (WHO) of human cases of infection with a new influenza A(H1N1)v virus of swine origin, the Turkish Ministry of Health launched a case-based reporting of influenza A(H1N1)v throughout the country on 27 April 2009. The index case was detected on 15 May 2009. As of 17 July 2009 the number of laboratory-confirmed cases of influenza A(H1N1)v totaled 128 of whom 38 were indigenous cases.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 13 Aug 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19304</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Epidemiological and transmissibility analysis of influenza A(H1N1)v in a southern hemisphere setting: Peru</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19299</link>
      <description>We present a preliminary analysis of 1,771 confirmed cases of influenza A(H1N1)v reported in Peru by 17 July including the frequency of the clinical characteristics, the spatial and age distribution of the cases and the estimate of the transmission potential. Age-specific frequency of cases was highest among school age children and young adults, with the lowest frequency of cases among seniors, a pattern that is consistent with reports from other countries. Estimates of the reproduction number lie in the range of 1.2 to 1.7, which is broadly consistent with previous estimates for this pandemic in other regions. Validation of these estimates will be possible as additional data become available.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 13 Aug 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19299</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>What will the next influenza season bring about: seasonal influenza or the new A(H1N1)v? An analysis of German influenza surveillance data</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19303</link>
      <description>For the next influenza season (winter 2009-10) the relative contributions to virus circulation and influenza-associated morbidity of the seasonal influenza viruses A(H3N2), A(H1N1) and B, and the new influenza A(H1N1)v are still unknown. We estimated the chances of seasonal influenza to circulate during the upcoming season using data of the German influenza sentinel scheme from 1992 to 2009. We calculated type and subtype-specific indices for past exposure and the corresponding morbidity indices for each season. For the upcoming season 2009-10 our model suggests that it is unlikely that influenza A(H3N2) will circulate with more than a low intensity, seasonal A(H1N1) with more than a low to moderate intensity, and influenza B with more than a low to median intensity. The probability of a competitive circulation of seasonal influenza A with the new A(H1N1)v is low, increasing the chance for the latter to dominate the next influenza season in Germany. </description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 13 Aug 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19303</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Description of the early stage of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in Germany, 27 April-16 June 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19295</link>
      <description>We report characteristics of the early stage of the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in Germany. Until 16 June 2009, 198 confirmed cases were notified. Almost half of the cases (47%) were imported, mostly from Mexico and the United States. About two third of indigenous cases were outbreak-related (with two large school-associated outbreaks, n=74). According to our results Germany is still in the early stage of the pandemic with limited domestic transmission.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 06 Aug 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19295</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Interim analysis of pandemic influenza (H1N1) 2009 in Australia: surveillance trends, age of infection and effectiveness of seasonal vaccination</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19288</link>
      <description>Between May and September each year, influenza sentinel surveillance is conducted in general practices in Melbourne and the state of Victoria in southern Australia. We describe the first 11 weeks of sentinel surveillance in 2009 (weeks 18-28), during which time pandemic influenza (H1N1) 2009 virus became established, and investigate the protective effect of seasonal influenza vaccine against laboratory-confirmed infection caused by the pandemic virus. At the time of reporting, the peak ILI activity in 2009 had been reached and was similar to the peak recorded in 2007 but below the peak of 2003.  The proportion of cases positive for any influenza virus increased from 6% in the first week of surveillance (week 18) to 59% by week 28, during which time the proportion of influenza viruses detected as pandemic influenza increased from zero to 95%, with at least 91% of all influenza viruses confirmed as pandemic influenza by the eighth week of surveillance (week 25). The median age of all 223 patients with pandemic influenza for whom age was known was 21 years (range 2-63 years) compared with the median age of 53 patients with seasonal H1N1 influenza in 2007 or 2008 of 23 years (range 1-75 years). There was no evidence of significant protection from seasonal vaccine against pandemic influenza virus infection in any age group.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 06 Aug 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19288</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A preliminary analysis of the epidemiology of influenza A(H1N1)v virus infection in Thailand from early outbreak data, June-July 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19292</link>
      <description>As the influenza A(H1N1)v pandemic unfolds globally, it is vital to monitor closely for signals of change in the current patterns of transmission. We estimate the basic reproduction ratio for A(H1N1)v virus in Thailand and propose a method to keep track of the actual case count notwithstanding the exponential growth rate.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 06 Aug 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19292</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Public health preparedness for two mass gathering events in the context of pandemic influenza (H1N1) 2009 - Serbia, July 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19296</link>
      <description>Preparedness planning for two large mass gatherings events were considered in Serbia in the context of pandemic influenza (H1N1) 2009. Planning included approaches to prevention, detection and response in order to mitigate the situation at this early stage of the epidemic in Serbia. Cases of influenza A(H1N1)v were identified nationally immediately prior to the mass gatherings but also identified in association with both events, as expected in the context of the pandemic situation. This article describes the experiences of planning and the epidemiological situation during the period of the mass gathering events.   </description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 06 Aug 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19296</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Community transmission of influenza A (H1N1)v virus at a rock festival in Belgium, 2-5 July 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19294</link>
      <description>On 6 July 2009 the Belgian enhanced surveillance system for influenza-like illness among travellers returning from influenza A(H1N1)v affected areas detected a case linked to a rock festival which took place on 2-5 July. The health authorities implemented communication and control measures leading to the detection of aditional cases. This paper describes the outbreak and its impact on the management of the influenza pandemic in Belgium</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 06 Aug 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19294</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Compliance and side effects of prophylactic oseltamivir treatment in a school in South West England</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19285</link>
      <description>School closure along with mass prophylactic oseltamivir treatment of pupils have been used in England and elsewhere to contain school outbreaks of influenza A(H1N1)v. We evaluated the protective effect, compliance with and side effects of oseltamivir chemoprophylactic treatment with a ten-day course of 1x 75mg given to 11-12-year-old pupils in one school year in a secondary school in South West England closed for ten days in response to a symptomatic laboratory-confirmed pupil.

We distributed a questionnaire to pupils in the affected school year in class after the school had re-opened. Questions included symptoms of flu-like illness, compliance with chemoprophylaxis and side effects. All present on the day, 248 (93.2%) participated. Compliance with chemoprophylaxis was high, 77% took the full course, 91% took at least seven days. Fifty-one percent experienced symptoms such as feeling sick (31.2%), headaches (24.3%) and stomach ache (21.1%). Although some children were ill with flu-like symptoms, those tested did not have A(H1N1)v infection. Compliance with oseltamivir chemoprophylaxis was high, although likely side effects were common. The burden of side effects needs to be considered when deciding on mass oseltamivir chemoprophylaxis in children especially given that the symptoms of A(H1N1)v influenza are generally mild.
</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 30 Jul 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19285</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Modified surveillance of influenza A(H1N1)v virus infections in France</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19276</link>
      <description>Up to early July 2009, surveillance of H1N1 cases in France was based on the identification of all possible cases in order to implement, around each of them, control measures aimed at delaying the spread of the virus. The global dissemination of the virus and the starting community transmission in France led us to shift to a population-based surveillance relying mainly on the identification and investigation of clusters of influenza-like illness, on the identification and individual follow-up of confirmed hospitalised cases as well as on the monitoring, through various sentinel systems, of the use of ambulatory and hospital care for influenza-like symptoms. </description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 23 Jul 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19276</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Enhanced surveillance of influenza A(H1N1)v in Greece during the containment phase</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19275</link>
      <description>Following the emergence of a novel influenza virus (influenza A(H1N1)v) with pandemic potential in late April 2009, public health measures were put in place in an effort to contain disease spread in Greece. These included enhanced surveillance of infections due to influenza A(H1N1)v virus, in order to continuously ascertain the situation and guide further public health action. On 15 July, Greece moved to mitigation phase. This report summarises surveillance findings in Greece during the delaying (or "containment") phase, from 30 April to 14 July 2009.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 23 Jul 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19275</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Clinical features of cases of influenza A (H1N1)v in Osaka prefecture, Japan, May 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19272</link>
      <description>This report describes the clinical characteristics of influenza A(H1N1)v virus infection in Osaka. By the end of May, 171 cases had been reported in Osaka. Most patients were from one school. No patient had a serious underlying medical condition.Clinical symptoms were mild and resembled those of seasonal influenza. The sensitivity of the rapid antigen test was 77%. Antivirals were given to the majority of the cases. Early antiviral treatment may have shortened the duration of fever.

</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 23 Jul 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19272</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Europe's initial experience with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 - mitigation and delaying policies and practices </title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19279</link>
      <description>Europe has experienced more than two months of the first transmissions and outbreak of the 2009 pandemic of A(H1N1)v. This article summarises some of the experience to date and looks towards the expected autumn increases of influenza activity that will affect every country. To date the distribution of transmission has been highly heterogenous between and within countries, with one country the United Kingdom (UK) experiencing the most cases and the highest transmission rates. Most infections are mild but there are steadily increasing numbers of people needing hospital care and more deaths are being reported. An initial difference in practice between Europe and North America was over case-finding and treatment with some authorities in Europe using active case-finding, contact tracing and treatment/prophylaxis with antivirals to try and delay transmission. This article details the history of this practice in the past two months and explains how and why countries are moving to mitigation, especially treating with antivirals those at higher risk of experiencing severe disease.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 23 Jul 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19279</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Influenza A(H1N1)v virus infections in Belgium, May-June 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19270</link>
      <description>In response to the ongoing influenza A(H1N1)v pandemic, first detected in North America in April 2009, Belgium has set up an active surveillance system for influenza-like illness among travellers returning from affected areas. This communication describes the clinical and epidemiological features of the first 43 laboratory-confirmed cases in Belgium.
</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19270</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Epidemiology and control of influenza A(H1N1)v in the Netherlands: the first 115 cases</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19267</link>
      <description>Introductions of the new influenza A(H1N1) variant virus in the Netherlands led to enhanced surveillance and infection control. By 24 June 2009, 115 cases were reported, of whom 44% were indigenously acquired. Severity of disease is similar to reports elsewhere. Our point estimate of the effective reproductive number (Re) for the initial phase of the influenza A(H1N1)v epidemic in the Netherlands was below one. Given that the Re estimate is based on a small number of indigenous cases and a limited time period, it needs to be interpreted cautiously.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 09 Jul 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19267</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Enhanced epidemiological surveillance of influenza A(H1N1)v in Italy</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19266</link>
      <description>As of 7 July 2009, a total of 158 laboratory-confirmed cases of influenza A(H1N1)v were reported in Italy, from half of the 21 Italian regions. To date all cases have had symptoms consistent with seasonal influenza and no severe or fatal cases have been reported. An active surveillance of cases has been set up in Italy in order to undertake appropriate measures to slow down the spread of the new virus. This report describes the routine and enhanced surveillance currently ongoing in Italy.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 09 Jul 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19266</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>An outbreak of influenza A(H1N1)v in a boarding school in South East England, May-June 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19263</link>
      <description>An outbreak of influenza A(H1N1)v was confirmed in May and June 2009 in a boarding school in South East England involving 102 symptomatic cases with influenza-like illness. Influenza A(H1N1)v infection was laboratory-confirmed by PCR in 62 pupils and one member of staff.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 09 Jul 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19263</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Preliminary descriptive epidemiology of a large school outbreak of influenza A(H1N1)v in the West Midlands, United Kingdom, May 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19264</link>
      <description>This report describes the preliminary results from the investigation of a large school outbreak of influenza A(H1N1)v in Birmingham, United Kingdom in May 2009, when influenza A(H1N1)v was confirmed in 64 of 175 (36%) symptomatic pupils and members of staff. </description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 09 Jul 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19264</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Outbreak of influenza A(H1N1)v without travel history in a school in the Toulouse district, France, June 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19265</link>
      <description>In June 2009, for the first time in France, a confirmed outbreak of influenza A(H1N1)v without history of travel occurred in a secondary school in Toulouse district. A total of 15 cases were confirmed among students of which three were asymptomatic. This report describes the outbreak and its public health implications. </description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 09 Jul 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19265</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Modelling of the influenza A(H1N1)v outbreak in Mexico City, April-May 2009, with control sanitary measures</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19254</link>
      <description>We use a time dependent modification of the Kermack and McKendrick model to study the evolution of the influenza A(H1N1)v epidemic reported in the Mexico City area under the control measures used during April and May 2009. The model illustrates how the sanitary measures postponed the peak of the epidemic and decreased its intensity. It provides quantitative predictions on the effect of relaxing the sanitary measures after a period of control. We show how the sanitary measures reduced the maximal prevalence of the infected population from 10% to less than 6% of the total population. We also show how the model predicts the time of maximal prevalence and explains the effect of the control measures.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19254</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The emerging influenza pandemic: estimating the case fatality ratio</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19255</link>
      <description>To determine appropriate influenza pandemic containment and mitigation measures, health authorities need to know the approximate case fatality ratio (CFR) for this new infection. We present four different methods for very provisionally estimating the plausible range of the CFR for symptomatic infection by this pandemic strain in developed countries. All of the methods produce substantially lower values (range 0.06% to 0.0004%) than a previously published estimate for Mexico (0.4%). As these results have many limitations, improved surveillance and serological surveys are needed in both developed and developing countries to produce more accurate estimates.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19255</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Influenza A(H1N1)v in the southern hemisphere - lessons to learn for Europe?</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19246</link>
      <description>
      </description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19246</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Virological surveillance of human cases of influenza A(H1N1)v virus in Italy: preliminary results</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19247</link>
      <description>In this report we describe the findings of laboratory-based surveillance of human cases of influenza A(H1N1)v virus infection in Italy, following the recent worldwide detection of this new virus among human population and the decision of the World Health Organization (WHO) to raise the level of pandemic alert.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19247</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Epidemiology of influenza A(H1N1)v virus infection in Japan, May - June 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19244</link>
      <description>Between 9 May and 4 June 2009, a total of 401 laboratory-confirmed cases of influenza A(H1N1)v virus were reported in Japan, from 16 of the 47 Japanese prefectures. The two areas most affected were Osaka prefecture and Kobe city where outbreaks in high schools occurred leading to school closures. To date all cases have had symptoms consistent with seasonal influenza and no severe or fatal cases have been reported.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19244</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>School closure is currently the main strategy to mitigate influenza A(H1N1)v: a modeling study</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19240</link>
      <description>Mathematical modeling was employed on recent epidemiological data from Mexico in order to assess the impact of intervention strategies on the spread of influenza A(H1N1)v in the setting of the European region. Active surveillance that will ensure timely treatment and home isolation of symptomatic cases in combination with school closure seem to form an efficient strategy to control the spread of influenza A(H1N1)v.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19240</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A variety of respiratory viruses found in symptomatic travellers returning from countries with ongoing spread of the new influenza A(H1N1)v virus strain</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19242</link>
      <description>Clinical specimens from 79 symptomatic individuals with a recent history of travel to countries with verified transmission of influenza A(H1N1)v (North America) were tested with a multiple real-time PCR targeting a broad range of agents that may cause acute respiratory infection. This analysis revealed that besides four cases of influenza A(H1N1)v, other respiratory viruses were diagnosed in almost 60% of the samples. These observations are a reminder that many different viral transmissions occur simultaneously in countries with ongoing spread of influenza A(H1N1)v. The findings demonstrate that the definition of suspected cases by clinical and epidemiological criteria has only a poor capacity for discriminating influenza A(H1N1)v from other viral infections.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19242</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Preliminary analysis of influenza A(H1N1)v individual and aggregated case reports from EU and EFTA countries</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19238</link>
      <description>Since the first importation of influenza A(H1N1)v virus to Europe in late April of this year, surveillance data have been collected in the Member States of the European Union and European Free Trade Association. This is the first preliminary analysis of aggregated and individual data available as of 8 June 2009 at European level. </description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19238</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Enhanced influenza surveillance on Réunion Island (southern hemisphere) in the context of the emergence of influenza A(H1N1)v</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19239</link>
      <description>With the winter season on the southern hemisphere that starts in Réunion Island in June seasonal influenza activity usually increases shortly afterwards. The new influenza A(H1N1)v virus is rapidly spreading worldwide and may reach the island during the coming winter season. We have therefore enhanced influenza surveillance to detect the introduction of influenza A(H1N1)v, monitor its spread and impact on public health and characterise potential viral changes, particularly if seasonal influenza A(H1N1), resistant to oseltamivir, co-circulates with A(H1N1)v.
</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19239</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Transmission potential of the new influenza A(H1N1) virus and its age-specificity in Japan</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19227</link>
      <description>On 16 May 2009, Japan confirmed its first three cases of new influenza A(H1N1) virus infection without a history of overseas travel, and by 1 June, 361 cases, owing to indigenous secondary transmission, have been confirmed. Of these, 287 cases (79.5%) were teenagers (i.e. between 10 and 19 years of age). The reproduction number is estimated at 2.3 (95% confidence interval: 2.0, 2.6). The average number of secondary transmissions involving minors (those under 20 years of age) traced back to infected minors is estimated at 2.8. That is, minors can sustain transmission even in the absence of adults. Estimates of the effective reproduction number Rt moved below 1 by 17 May. Active surveillance and public health interventions, including school closures most likely have contributed to keeping Rt below one.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 04 Jun 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19227</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Epidemiology of new influenza A (H1N1) virus infection, United Kingdom, April - June 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19232</link>
      <description>Following the previous report to Eurosurveillance on 14 May 2009, the number of confirmed cases of new influenza A(H1N1) has continued to increase in the United Kingdom. By 31 May, UK surveillance activities had detected a total of 252 confirmed cases. Seventy (28%) were related to travel to the United States and Mexico. There is evidence of spread in households, schools and the community with increases in secondary (n=40), tertiary (n=125) and sporadic (n=13) cases. The new influenza A(H1N1) virus infection continues to cause a mild illness predominately affecting younger age-groups with a low rate of hospitalisation. </description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 04 Jun 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19232</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Evaluation of four real-time PCR assays for detection of influenza A(H1N1)v viruses</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19230</link>
      <description>The sensitivity and specificity of four real-time PCR assays (HPA A(H1)v, CDC A (H1)v, HPA A(N1)v and NVRL S-OIV assays) was evaluated for detection of influenza A(H1N1)v viruses. Nose and throat swab samples containing influenza A(H1N1)v viruses, seasonal influenza AH3N2, AH1N1, influenza B viruses, or negative for influenza viruses were tested by the four assays. Specificity was also analysed using influenza A viruses of different subtypes and non-related respiratory viruses. The sensitivities and specificities of the four assays were in a similar range and suitable for diagnostic use. The HPA (H1)v and the S-OIV assays were the most sensitive assays for use as a first line test, but the S-OIV assay was less specific, detecting all avian subtypes of influenza A viruses tested. The results of this study demonstrate that the concurrent use of primary diagnostic and confirmatory assays provides rapid and accurate assessment of confirmed cases, and allows appropriate management of patients. </description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 04 Jun 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19230</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Origins of the new influenza A(H1N1) virus: time to take action</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19228</link>
      <description>To gain insight into the possible origins of the 2009 outbreak of new influenza A(H1N1), we performed two independent analyses of genetic evolution of the new influenza A(H1N1) virus. Firstly, protein homology analyses of more than 400 sequences revealed that this virus most likely evolved from recent swine viruses. Secondly, phylogenetic analyses of 5,214 protein sequences of influenza A(H1N1) viruses (avian, swine and human) circulating in North America for the last two decades (from 1989 to 2009) indicated that the new influenza A(H1N1) virus possesses a distinctive evolutionary trait (genetic distinctness). This appears to be a particular characteristic in pig-human interspecies transmission of influenza A. Thus these analyses contribute to the evidence of the role of pig populations as "mixing vessels" for influenza A(H1N1) viruses.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 04 Jun 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19228</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Norwegians approve of the health authorities' strategy to communicate worst case pandemic scenarios</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19231</link>
      <description>According to the Norwegian pandemic preparedness plans, health authorities shall assess their communication activities before and during an outbreak of infectious diseases. A survey was conducted on 29 April 2009 on acceptance of communications by the national public health authorities concerning the emerging threat from the new influenza A(H1N1) virus. The survey was similar to other surveys in 2005-6 about the avian flu. The results were not very different - the overall majority of the people interviewed were not worried and the health authorities were regarded as trustworthy.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 04 Jun 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19231</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>To baptise a virus and its disease</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19225</link>
      <description>
      </description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 28 May 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19225</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Cluster of new influenza A(H1N1) cases in travellers returning from Scotland to Greece - community transmission within the European Union?</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19226</link>
      <description>On 26 and 27 May, the Hellenic Centre for Disease Control and Prevention in Greece reported two confirmed cases of new influenza A(H1N1) virus infection in travellers returning from Scotland. The two cases had no apparent traceable links to an infectious source. Herein we report details of the two cases and potential public health implications.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 28 May 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19226</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>New influenza A(H1N1) virus infections in France, April - May 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19221</link>
      <description>Since the emergence of a new influenza A(H1N1) virus in North America and its international spread, an active surveillance of cases of infection due to this virus has been set up in France in order to undertake appropriate measures to slow down the spread of the new virus. This report describes the epidemiological and clinical characteristics of the 16 laboratory confirmed cases diagnosed in France as of 20 May 2009.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 28 May 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19221</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Cluster analysis of the origins of the new influenza A(H1N1) virus</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19224</link>
      <description>In March and April 2009, a new strain of influenza A(H1N1) virus has been isolated in Mexico and the United States. Since the initial reports more than 10,000 cases have been reported to the World Health Organization, all around the world. Several hundred isolates have already been sequenced and deposited in public databases. We have studied the genetics of the new strain and identified its closest relatives through a cluster analysis approach. We show that the new virus combines genetic information related to different swine influenza viruses. Segments PB2, PB1, PA, HA, NP and NS are related to swine H1N2 and H3N2 influenza viruses isolated in North America. Segments NA and M are related to swine influenza viruses isolated in Eurasia.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 28 May 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19224</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Preparedness for the prevention and control of influenza outbreaks on passenger ships in the EU: the SHIPSAN TRAINET project communication</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19219</link>
      <description>Passenger ships carry a large number of people in confined spaces. A case of the new influenza A (H1N1) virus aboard a passenger ship is an expected event and would lead to rapid spread of the virus, if preventive measures are not in place.  However, many cruise lines have detailed policies and procedures to deal with cases of influenza like illness (ILI). The EU SHIPSAN and SHIPSAN TRAINET projects include in their objectives guidelines for the prevention and control of communicable diseases aboard passenger ships. A literature review showed that from 1997 to 2005, nine confirmed outbreaks of influenza were linked to passenger ships, with attack rates up to 37%. It is important to establish and maintain a surveillance system for ILI aboard passenger ships, in order to systematically collect data that can help to determine the baseline illness levels. Monitoring these will enable early identification of outbreaks and allow timely implementation of control measures.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 28 May 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19219</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Influenza A(H5N1): an overview of the current situation</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19216</link>
      <description>Influenza viruses continue to threaten the world with a new pandemic. While currently attention is focused on the newly emerged A(H1N1) virus, the avian influenza A(H5N1) virus is still a cause of concern.  Extended research is focused on the genetic evolution of the viruses, as well as their susceptibility to available antiviral drugs.  One of the major priorities of the World Health Organization is to develop candidate vaccines, four of which are already licensed for use in the European Union. Since the last influenza pandemic in 1968, our knowledge of the influenza virus and its biology has greatly increased, revealing new avenues in the research for antiviral strategies and the development of effective vaccines
</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 21 May 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19216</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Why are Mexican data important?</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19212</link>
      <description>This issue of Eurosurveillance contains an article by a French team on the transmission of the new influenza A(H1N1) in Mexico, which uses published figures from the outbreak to estimate important parameters for transmission, among them the reproduction rate, R [1]. Such studies may have important implications for public health action in Europe.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19212</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>New influenza A(H1N1) virus infections in Spain, April-May 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19209</link>
      <description>An outbreak of infections with a new influenza A(H1N1) virus that was first detected in the United States and Mexico is currently ongoing worldwide. This report describes the initial epidemiological actions and outbreak investigation of the first 98 laboratory confirmed cases of infection with this new virus in Spain.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19209</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Epidemiology of new influenza A(H1N1) in the United Kingdom, April - May 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19213</link>
      <description>Following importations of cases from Mexico and the United States, by 11 May, United Kingdom surveillance activities had detected a total of 65 individuals with confirmed infections caused by the new influenza A(H1N1) virus. The infections were mainly in young people and younger adults and they spread within households and within schools. The illness in the United Kingdom is similar in severity to seasonal influenza and to date, besides one case of bacterial pneumonia, no clinically serious cases have occurred.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19213</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A preliminary estimation of the reproduction ratio for new influenza A(H1N1) from the outbreak in Mexico, March-April 2009</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19205</link>
      <description>As of 12 May 2009, 5,251 cases of the new influenza A(H1N1) have been officially reported to the World Health Organization (WHO) from 30 countries. We suggest that the reproduction ratio was less than 2.2-3.1 in Mexico, depending on the generation interval. </description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19205</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>First sequence-confirmed case of infection with the new influenza A(H1N1) strain in Germany</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19203</link>
      <description>Here, we report on the first sequence-confirmed case of infection with the new influenza A(H1N1) virus in Germany. Two direct contacts of the patient were laboratory-confirmed as cases and demonstrate a chain of direct human-to-human transmission.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19203</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Initial epidemiological findings in the European Union following the declaration of pandemic alert level 5 due to influenza A (H1N1)</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19204</link>
      <description>The recent detection of a novel influenza A(H1N1) virus has led to the first WHO declaration of a Public Health Event of International Concern under the International Health Regulations (IHR 2005). Here we review the early epidemiological findings of confirmed cases in Mexico, the US, Canada and EU/EFTA countries. Strengthened surveillance and continued, transparent communication across public health agencies globally will be necessary in coming months. </description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19204</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Pandemic phase level 4: human cases of the novel influenza A/H1N1 strain confirmed in Scotland and Spain</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19185</link>
      <description>
      </description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 30 Apr 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19185</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The origin of the recent swine influenza A(H1N1) virus infecting humans</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19193</link>
      <description>Preliminary analysis of the genome of the new H1N1 influenza A virus responsible for the current pandemic indicates that all genetic segments are related closest to those of common swine influenza viruses.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 30 Apr 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19193</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Pandemic phase level 5: rising number of cases in the European Union</title>
      <link>http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19192</link>
      <description>
      </description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 30 Apr 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid ispermalink="false">http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=19192</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>