One imported and five secondary cases of measles were detected in Finland between June and August 2017. The measles sequences available for four laboratory-confirmed cases were identical and belonged to serotype D8. The large number of potentially exposed Finnish and foreign individuals called for close cooperation of national and international public health authorities and other stakeholders. Raising awareness among healthcare providers and ensuring universally high vaccination coverage is crucial to prevent future clusters and outbreaks.

A large measles outbreak has been ongoing in Milan and surrounding areas. From 1 March to 30 June 2017, 203 measles cases were laboratory-confirmed (108 sporadic cases and 95 related to 47 clusters). Phylogenetic analysis revealed the co-circulation of two different genotypes, D8 and B3. Both genotypes caused nosocomial clusters in two hospitals. The rapid analysis of epidemiological and phylogenetic data allowed effective surveillance and tracking of transmission pathways.

We describe a nosocomial outbreak of measles that occurred in an Italian hospital during the first months of 2017, involving 35 persons and including healthcare workers, support personnel working in the hospital, visitors and community contacts. Late diagnosis of the first case, support personnel not being promptly recognised as hospital workers and diffusion of the infection in the emergency department had a major role in sustaining this outbreak.

Thailand reported the first Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) case on 18 June 2015 (day 4) in an Omani patient with heart condition who was diagnosed with pneumonia on hospital admission on 15 June 2015 (day 1). Two false negative RT-PCR on upper respiratory tract samples on days 2 and 3 led to a 48-hour diagnosis delay and a decision to transfer the patient out of the negative pressure unit (NPU). Subsequent examination of sputum later on day 3 confirmed MERS coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection. The patient was immediately moved back into the NPU and then transferred to Bamrasnaradura Infectious Disease Institute. Over 170 contacts were traced; 48 were quarantined and 122 self-monitored for symptoms. High-risk close contacts exhibiting no symptoms, and whose laboratory testing on the 12th day after exposure was negative, were released on the 14th day. The Omani Ministry of Health (MOH) was immediately notified using the International Health Regulation (IHR) mechanism. Outbreak investigation was conducted in Oman, and was both published on the World Health Organization (WHO) intranet and shared with Thailand’s IHR focal point. The key to successful infection control, with no secondary transmission, were the collaborative efforts among hospitals, laboratories and MOHs of both countries.