Eurosurveillance - Volume 25, Issue 36, 10 September 2020

In August 2020, during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, five locally acquired cases of dengue virus type 1 were detected in a family cluster in Vicenza Province, North-East Italy where Aedes albopictus mosquitoes are endemic. The primary case was an importation from West Sumatra, Indonesia. This is the first outbreak of autochthonous dengue reported in Italy. During the COVID-19 pandemic, screening of febrile travelers from endemic countries is crucial in areas where competent vectors are present.

In March 2020, we observed an outbreak of COVID-19 among a relatively homogenous group of 199 young (median age 21 years; 87% men) Swiss recruits. By comparing physical endurance before and in median 45 days after the outbreak, we found a significant decrease in predicted maximal aerobic capacity in COVID-19 convalescent but not in asymptomatically infected and SARS-CoV-2 naive recruits. This finding might be indicative of lung injury after apparently mild COVID-19 in young adults.

We investigated data from severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infected 0–19 year olds, who attended schools/childcare facilities, to assess their role in SARS-CoV-2 transmission after these establishments’ reopening in May 2020 in Baden-Württemberg, Germany. Child-to-child transmission in schools/childcare facilities appeared very uncommon. We anticipate that, with face mask use and frequent ventilation of rooms, transmission rates in schools/childcare facilities would remain low in the next term, even if classes’ group sizes were increased.

Europe-wide activities to improve biosafety and biosecurity performed within the frameworks of the European Union (EU)-funded Joint Actions EMERGE and QUANDHIP led to the development of an Integrated European Checklist for Laboratory Biorisk Management (ECL).

To better understand different approaches shaping biorisk management (BRM) systems on an operational level in high containment laboratories, the ECL was used to map the implementation of BRM in 32 high containment laboratories in 18 countries in Europe. The results suggest that the BRM elements referring to standard microbiological working practices and the handling of infectious material were fulfilled particularly well. The elements safety exercises involving internal and external emergency responders, and appropriate decommissioning plans were not fulfilled particularly well. BRM in Biosafety Level (BSL) 4 laboratories handling Risk Group (RG) 4 viruses appear to vary among each other less than BSL3 laboratories handling RG 3 bacteria. It is important to agree on comparable regulations in Europe as high containment laboratories are indispensable for a safe, quick and effective response to public health threats. As high containment laboratories may also present a public health risk it is crucial to have robust BRM on organisational and operational levels.