The extent of monkeypox virus environmental contamination of surfaces is unclear. We examined surfaces in rooms occupied by two monkeypox patients on their fourth hospitalisation day. Contamination with up to 10⁵ viral copies/cm² on inanimate surfaces was estimated by PCR and the virus was successfully isolated from surfaces with more than 10⁶ copies. These data highlight the importance of strict adherence of hospital staff to recommended protective measures. If appropriate, pre-exposure or early post-exposure vaccination should be considered for individuals at risk.

Compared with individuals unvaccinated in the current and three previous influenza seasons, in 2021/22, influenza vaccine effectiveness at primary care level was 37% (95% CI: 16 to 52) for current season vaccination, regardless of previous doses, and 35% (95% CI: −3 to 45) for only previous seasons vaccination. Against influenza A(H3N2), estimates were 39% (95% CI: 16 to 55) and 24% (95% CI: −8 to 47) suggesting moderate effectiveness of current season vaccination and possible remaining effect of prior vaccinations.

As the COVID-19 pandemic began in early 2020, primary care influenza sentinel surveillance networks within the Influenza - Monitoring Vaccine Effectiveness in Europe (I-MOVE) consortium rapidly adapted to COVID-19 surveillance. This study maps system adaptations and lessons learned about aligning influenza and COVID-19 surveillance following ECDC / WHO/Europe recommendations and preparing for other diseases possibly emerging in the future. Using a qualitative approach, we describe the adaptations of seven sentinel sites in five European Union countries and the United Kingdom during the first pandemic phase (March–September 2020). Adaptations to sentinel systems were substantial (2/7 sites), moderate (2/7) or minor (3/7 sites). Most adaptations encompassed patient referral and sample collection pathways, laboratory testing and data collection. Strengths included established networks of primary care providers, highly qualified testing laboratories and stakeholder commitments. One challenge was the decreasing number of samples due to altered patient pathways. Lessons learned included flexibility establishing new routines and new laboratory testing. To enable simultaneous sentinel surveillance of influenza and COVID-19, experiences of the sentinel sites and testing infrastructure should be considered. The contradicting aims of rapid case finding and contact tracing, which are needed for control during a pandemic and regular surveillance, should be carefully balanced.